Horse Museum was another Star Stable private server, that closed around the end of October.
Star Stable (officially Star Stable Online, or SSO) is a 3D MMORPG focused on horses, adventure, friends and magic. The first server opened around 2011.
Altough the game is gone, I still wanted to post my findings here. Maybe this is going to help someone, or clear the smoke a little bit.
I have been playing this game since 2012, and seeing all that misinformation caused me physical pain. Iβm not supporting this project, but calling it malware without any proper research is not okay.
Tools used: Ghidra, Wireshark, UniExtract.
Dropper, network analysis
The first step was analyzing the setup.exe installer. A quick SHA-256 hash check on VirusTotal returned a 0/60 detection score. However, a clean score on an installer wrapper just means the outer shell hasn't been fingerprinted yet.
Using UniExtract, I unpacked the executable. It contained no actual game assets, only standard Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) components:
modern-wizard.bmp (UI graphics)
nsDialogs.dll (Custom dialog interfaces)
System.dll (System-level command execution)
setup.exe is a dropper stub made to reach out to a remote server and download the game files.
To see where the dropper was communicating, I loaded up Wireshark and applied a tcp.flags.syn == 1 && tcp.flags.ack == 0 filter. Summing the transmitted bytes from the top six external IPs equaled exactly 956 MB.
The installer is simply establishing an encrypted HTTPS connection to MEGA.nz, which natively splits large downloads across multiple Content Delivery Network (CDN) servers to maximize speed. It isn't a botnet.
DLL hijack
Right next to the legit executable (PXStudioRuntimeMMO.exe) was a 50 KB winmm.dll.
winmm.dll is a standard Windows multimedia library that belongs inside C:\Windows\System32. Because Windows prioritizes local directory files over system-level files during execution, the game unknowingly loads this custom 50 KB proxy instead of the real Windows library.
This is a what we call a DLL Hijack.
Decompiling this fake winmm.dll in Ghidra shows a small script that side-loads a secondary custom payload called patch.dll into the game's active memory, and then quietly passes all actual multimedia requests back to the real Windows system.
Static analysis
patch.dll overwrites the game's network functions in real-time, redirecting login attempts away from the official servers and pointing them toward the private server's backend.
Tracing its execution from the entry point in Ghidra, I located a hooking engine utilizing the Windows API VirtualProtect to unlock memory pages. It physically overwrites the first few bytes of the game's legitimate networking functions with the 0xE9 (JMP) assembly instruction.
The private server targets the offset 0x1D690.
By loading the legacy game client into Ghidra and adding the standard base memory address, we find the exact injection point:
0x00400000 + 0x1D690 = 0x0041D690
Jumping to 0x0041D690 in the original executable reveals the game's native XOR decryption loop. The developers intentionally detoured the execution flow right before the game attempts to read its proprietary .cch archive files.
DRM bypass
By returning to patch.dll and following the JMP detour destination, I found the custom memory parser the developers wrote to replace the game's original cryptography.
In legacy MMOs, network packets and game archive headers are often read in fixed-size structures.
The decompiled code utilizes a modulo operation pointing to 0x3c (equals to 60 in decimal...), strongly suggesting that the custom .hors archive files downloaded from MEGA contain headers that are exactly 60 bytes long.
Inside this parser (labeled FUN_10002a20), I found the final nail in the coffin.
- uVar5 is seeded with 0x811c9dc5,
- the loop XORs a byte of the file against the seed,
- it multiplies the result by 0x1000193.
FNV-1a is a standard, incredibly fast hashing algorithm used to verify file integrity. It is not encryption. The developers completely gutted the original proprietary DRM and replaced it with a simple FNV-1a checksum to prevent players from modding the private server's files to cheat.
Because the official game client doesn't know how to read this custom 60-byte FNV-1a header, it crashes immediately if developers try to inspect the .hors files using official internal tools.
At the very end of the function, a "trampoline" pointer (DAT_101068cc)(param_3) jumps back into the game's original code so the boot sequence can continue natively:
net.dll
Top menu -> Search -> For Strings....
Filters used:
- .onion,
- 127.0.0.1 or localhost: custom game proxies usually run a hidden Tor client in the background,
- 9050 or 9150: default TCP ports for the Tor daemon and the Tor Browser bundle,
- SOCKS: standard protocol used to route application traffic through a Tor proxy.
- discord: webhooks
What I found:
They are not using Tor ports. Instead, they have statically compiled GnuTLS (a standard, legitimate open-source cryptography library...) into the DLL to handle secure, encrypted communication (HTTPS/TLS) with their server.
localhost: this is a custom-built network tunneling protocol. Because the legacy 2014 game client likely uses outdated, unencrypted network code, they built a "Session Router" proxy. The old game client sends its unencrypted packets locally to 127.0.0.1. Then, net.dll intercepts those packets, wraps them in modern GnuTLS encryption, and forwards them to the new backend servers.
Absent: .onion, discord: basically confirms they have abandoned the Tor service backend and are not using script-kiddie Discord webhooks.
Stack Strings?
Highly unlikely the Horse Museum developers possessed the skill to implement stack strings, since they didn't even pack their DLL or hide their basic anti-debugging APIs.
Conclusion
Enlighten me, dear Star Stable community. How did any of you came up with these?
Before declaring a cybersecurity incident, it is highly recommended to actually look at the code. Ghidra is free.
Seek the truth beyond the walls
Navier






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